Technological University Dublin

ARROW@TU Dublin
Dissertations

Social Sciences

2009-07-02

Confidential Sources and Contempt of Court: An argument for
change
Angel Fahy
Technological University Dublin

Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/aaschssldis
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Fahy, Angel: Confidential Sources and Contempt of Court: An argument for change. Dublin, DIT, July 2009.

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open
access by the Social Sciences at ARROW@TU Dublin. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of ARROW@TU Dublin. For more
information, please contact arrow.admin@tudublin.ie,
aisling.coyne@tudublin.ie.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License

Confidential Sources and Contempt of Court: An argument for change

Submitted by: Angel Strickland Fahy, BA.
For the award of: Master of Arts at Dublin Institute of Technology, Aungier St,
School of Law.
Supervisor: Eavan Murphy
Submitted: June 2nd 2009.

I certify that this thesis which I now submit for examination for the award of Master
of Arts, is entirely my own work and has not been taken from the work of others save
and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of
my work.
This thesis was prepared according to the regulations for postgraduate study by
research of the Dublin Institute of Technology and has not been submitted in whole or
in part for an award in any other Institute or University.
The work reported on this thesis conforms to the principles and requirements of the
Institute’s guidelines for ethics in research.
The Institute has permission to keep, to lend or to copy this thesis in whole or in part,
on condition that any such use of the material of the thesis be duly acknowledged.

________________
Angel Strickland Fahy

This thesis sought to examine the law on contempt of court as it pertained to
journalists’ refusal to give evidence that would reveal the identity of their confidential
sources of information. It argued that current law in this jurisdiction does not go far
enough to protect journalists’ sources and, consequently, press freedom. It contended
that despite the introduction of a statutory provision in the UK to provide qualified
immunity from contempt charges for journalists who refused to reveal their sources,
the law is not sufficiently clear to allow journalists to grant confidentiality without
fear of prosecution. This thesis found that the law governing contempt of court and
revelation of sources in the UK is stacked in favour of quantifiable interests such as
the threat to businesses posed by leaked information rather than safeguarding press
freedom.
This thesis examined the law on journalists’ sources in the US and Sweden,
highlighting the greater weight given to protecting anonymous sources in these
jurisdictions. It then argued for the introduction of restrictions on the use of
anonymous sources and unattributed information based on recent libel actions taken
following inaccurate and baseless newspaper allegations. It found a correlation
between the use of unattributed information and libellous material, citing the recent
McCann abduction case as an example. It also found a link between commercial
pressure and the trend towards using anonymous sources.

Chapter One:
Ireland, contempt
of court and
journalists’ sources

1

Introduction:

Morland J: It is vitally important if the press is to perform its public function in our
democracy, that a person possessed of information on matters of public interest
should not be deterred from coming forward by fear of exposure. To encourage
such disclosure, it is necessary to offer a thorough protection to confidential
sources generally. 1

A free press is an essential component of any democratic society. The free flow of
information, which contributes to informed debate about the use and abuse of power
is, therefore, a condition of democracy. 2 As such, the press requires significant
protection in order to function as a fourth estate, informing the public on matters of
interest and acting as a check on those in power. In order to fulfill this function, the
press often relies on sources of information who wish for their identity to remain
undisclosed. One vital element of press freedom is that journalists can promise and
maintain the confidentiality of their sources. As Quinn asserts, many of the most
important stories the media carries involve publishing information that someone else
does not want to be known. 3 Such requests for anonymity are made for a number of
reasons, usually because the source fears some kind of retribution, from losing his/her
job, threats to safety or even prosecution. It is a basic rule of journalistic ethics that if
a journalist promises to keep his/her source anonymous, he/she must honour the
assurance. 4

The right to freedom of expression and the press is afforded by Article 40, section six
of the Irish Constitution of 1937, which guarantees the right of citizens to ‘express

1

John v Express [2000] 1 All ER 280.
Cositgan, R, Protection of Journalists Sources, Public Law, 2007, at page 464.
3
Quinn, F., Law for Journalists (Pearson Education, 2007) at page 258.
4
NUJ Code of Conduct: ‘Members of the National Union of Journalists are expected to abide by the
following professional principles: 7. Protects the identity of sources who supply information in
confidence and material gathered in the course of her/his work.’
2

2

freely their convictions and opinions’. This right is qualified with the inclusion of
subsection (1), which adds:

The education of public opinion being, however, a matter of such grave import
to the common good, the State shall endeavour to ensure that organs of public
opinion, such as radio, the press, the cinema, while preserving their rightful
liberty of expression, including criticism of Government policy, shall not be
used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State.

The right to freedom of expression is guaranteed by Article 10, section one of the
European Human Rights Convention, which guarantees to the right of freedom of
expression including the ‘freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and idea without interference.’ It does not, as does the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution, specifically guarantee freedom of the press. Press
freedom is included, within the broader freedom of expression, in the Human Rights
Act of 1998 at section 12. However, in a series of cases, the European Court
articulated the close connection between freedom of expression ad the essential role
played by the press when reporting on matters of public interest, and in doing so has
accorded the press a special level of protection under article 10.

The Constitutional right to a free press is not absolute and the law governing
contempt of court serves as a significant check on press freedom. The court has a
‘right to everyman’s evidence, except for those persons protected by constitutional or
other established and recognised privilege.’ 5 In Ireland there is no protection in law
for journalists’ sources and they may be held in contempt of court for failing to reveal
the identity of their informants when required to do so by a court of law. In the

5

Re O’Kelly (108) ILTR 97.
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leading case, Re Kevin O’Kelly, 6 Walsh J in the Court of Criminal Appeal underlined
that journalists were no more legally or constitutionally immune than any other
citizen from disclosing information received in confidence., and thus, from answering
a question put to them in court.

Contempt of court is wholly a common law offence in this country unlike in England
where 1981 the Contempt of Court Act was introduced to provide immunity from
disclosure for journalists unless such disclosure was deemed necessary for one of
three prescribed exceptions. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Contempt of court – defined:
Journalists can be found guilty of contempt in a number of ways, both civil and
criminal, ranging from prejudging court proceedings through their coverage to
scandalising the court. For the purposes of this thesis, only contempt in the face of the
court will be discussed and the discussion will be limited to journalists’ sources and
disclosure orders. In facie contempt is a criminal contempt punishable by
imprisonment for a fixed period. This aspect of contempt relates to unlawful acts
committed physically in a courtroom. 7 Refusing to answer a question posed by a
judge falls under this category. In Keegan v de Burca, 8 contempt consisting of refusal
to answer a question in court was described, in a dissenting judgement in the Supreme
Court, as:

…an offence which continues as long as the refusal continues and cannot
adequately be measured while the offence continues; if dealt with by a fixed
sentence, the sentence might be oppressive on the offender whereas a sentence
6

Ibid.
Murphy, Y., Journalists and the law, (2nd ed, Roundhall, 2000) at page 122.
8
[1973] IR 223.
7
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which ends when the offence ceases and the contempt is purged cannot be
oppressive. It is not the declaration of refusal to answer the question, but the
refusal to comply with the requirement which is the gist of the offence.
Furthermore, in a case such as this the purpose of the sentence is not primarily
punitive but coercive.

Contempt in facie curiae (in the face of the court) encompasses any conduct before
the court that interferes with or disrupts proceedings and is used to aid and maintain
the effective administration of justice. Consequently, as McGonagle asserts, ‘the
judge has unfettered power to deal with the interruption there and then, effectively
acting as judge, jury and prosecutor. 9

The Irish Experience:

This thesis seeks to make a case for an amendment to the law of contempt to include a
protection for journalists’ confidential sources of information. This topic of contempt
of court was given a thorough analysis by the Law Reform Commission in its
Consultation Paper of 1991 and it’s Final Recommendation of 1994. In addition, the
prominent media law academic Marie McGonagle, along with Kevin O’Boyle, made
a case for an amendment to the law as it pertains to the media in her textbook on
media law 10 . It is contended that while this prestigious legal research provided an
excellent discussion and valid argument of the topic, it is now outdated. Since
McGonagle’s 1995 essay, a wealth of significant UK case law, and a key decision of
the European Court of Human Rights 11 have altered the legal landscape in relation to
confidential sources: These cases have highlighted the increasing recognition courts

9

McGonagle, M., ed, Law and the Media: The Views of Journalists and Lawyers (Round Hall, 1997)
at page 134.
10
Ibid at pages 127 – 179.
11
Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 123.
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are willing to give such sources; and have drawn attention to the pressing need to
introduce clear legislation to standardise decisions in the area. These cases will be
discussed in detail in the next chapter but first the law as it stands in this country must
be mapped out.

The previously mentioned the Re O’Kelly case must form the starting point for any
discussion on how courts deal with the issue of journalists’ sources, underlining the
lack of privilege for journalists acting in their professional capacity. In this case,
Kevin O’Kelly, a well-known journalist at RTÉ, was charged with contempt of court
and sentenced to three months imprisonment for refusing to reveal a source - a
sentence that was reduced to a fine on appeal. The contempt arose during the trial of
Mr. Sean MacStiofain who stood accused of membership of an illegal organisation.
Mr. Kelly was called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution but refused to confirm
that the man speaking on a tape recording he made during interview was the accused,
Mr. MacStiofain.

As he was appearing as a journalist he did not feel free to disclose this information,
believing naming his source would have knock on consequences for other newsmen.
He said:
My position is to disclose the circumstances under which the statements on the
tape were made available to me would be a breach of confidence between me
and a client which, I feel, were I to breach that confidence, I would be not only
putting my own exercise as a journalist into jeopardy, I would make it very
difficult for any journalist all over Ireland to promote the public good by
fostering the free exchange of public opinion. 12

However, the fact that Mr. O’Kelly conducted this interview for the purpose of public
broadcasting, which would invariably reveal the identity of the source, resulted in him
12

Note 5 at page 97.
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being ordered to confirm Mr. MacStiofain’s identity in court and his subsequent
charge of contempt for non-compliance with this order.

In his judgment, Walsh J. stated:
The obligation of all citizens, including journalists, to give relevant testimony
with respect to criminal conduct does not constitute a harassment of journalists
or other newsmen. If a journalist were to be invited to witness the commission
of a crime in his capacity as a journalist and received the invitation only as a
result of that capacity, the courts could not for a moment entertain a claim that
he should be privileged from giving evidence of what he had witnessed simply
because of the fact that he was there as a journalist.

He added:
In the present state of criminal law, in such a case a journalist concealing such
knowledge, like any other person in a similar position, might well find himself
guilty of misprision of a felony where a felony was concerned.

Walsh J. did not say in express terms that the court is obliged to require disclosure in
a case where the evidence, although relevant, is not necessary in the interests of
justice. Thus, although declining to recognise the existence of a ‘journalistic
privilege’, as such, the courts may at their discretion decline to require such disclosure
where it cannot be justified 13 . Indeed, it must be noted that the O’Kelly case was not,
in fact, a strong one for the exercise of a claim to journalistic privilege as the
journalist had not promised confidentiality to his source at the time of the interview.

However, it is interesting to note that Walsh J. did not expressly inquire into the
relevance of the question posed to the journalist nor was the necessity for answering it
examined. In fact, O’Kelly’s sentence was quashed on the grounds that his refusal to
answer the question ‘while perhaps adding some little extra difficulty to the case, did

13

Law Reform Commission Final Report on Contempt of Court (1994).
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not effectively impede the presentation of the prosecution’s case.’ 14 In other words, as
McGonagle asserts, a fine was imposed even though O’Kelly’s testimony was not
necessary, 15 highlighting a lack of clarity in the current law.

The Law Reform Commission findings
In 1994 the LRC introduced a consultation paper on contempt of court. The law as it
pertains to evidence and journalistic privilege was examined. The LRC recommended
that the law relating to the obligation of journalists to give evidence, and, when doing
so, to answer questions, should not be altered. That is, journalists are not entitled to
refuse to answer questions as to the source of information given to them in confidence
on the ground that such communications are privileged. Thus, they did not find that
journalistic privilege to refuse to disclose sources of information should be part of the
law .It was the Commission’s view that while such privilege would be constitutionally
permissible, there were no policy grounds for altering O’Kelly. The 1991 paper
argued that while O’Kelly’s case is authority for the proposition that journalists enjoy
no privilege to withhold their sources, the courts would have regard to the
confidentiality.

It is interesting to note that the Commission made reference to sacerdotal privilege,
which is recognised by the Irish courts but not by their English counterparts. It exists
in addition to legal privilege and would suggest that not only is the effective
administration of justice given greater weight than freedom of expression but the right
to religion is also considered more worthy of protection.

14
15

Note 5.
McGonagle, M., Media Law (2nd ed, Round Hall, 2003) at page 190.

8

Sacerdotal privilege was recognised in Cook v Carroll 16 . In this case, a parish priest
interviewed together a girl parishioner who alleged that she had been seduced and the
parishioner whom she held responsible for such seduction. Subsequently, the girl's
mother brought an action for damages for seduction against this parishioner, and the
priest was called to give evidence of what passed at this interview. He refused to give
evidence, claiming privilege.

The court held that his refusal to give evidence was justified and was not a contempt
of court, expressing the view that communications made in confidence to a parish
priest, in a private consultation between him and his parishioners, are privileged.

The LRC pointed to the four-fold test favoured by Gavan Duffy J in Cook v Carroll to
determine if disclosure should be ordered which is all follows:
(1) The information must originate in a confidence that the identity of the
informant will not be disclosed; (2) The element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between
the parties; (3) The relationship must be one, which in the opinion of the Court
should be fostered; and
(4) The injury that would result for the relationship by reason of the disclosure
of the identity of the informant must be greater than the benefit thus gained for
the correct disposal of the proceedings.
While acknowledging that the Constitution would permit a legislative exclusion for
journalists, it argues that in light of the Cook v Carroll test ‘it is not clear to what
extent, if any, the present law is inhibiting the publication of material which should, in
the public interest, be published.’ 17 It is contended that such an assertion does not
address the heart of the issue in question – the impact on the free flow of information
in the public interest. It cannot be known what vital information may go unpublished

16
17

[1945] I.R. 515.
Law Reform Consultation Paper on Contempt of Court, 1991 at page 245.
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or what corruption may go unpunished if sources refrain from coming forward with
information because journalists cannot guarantee their anonymity. The damage to the
media’s ability to perform its vital public watchdog role cannot not be quantified, nor
can the potential increase in whistle-blowers, should statutory protection be
introduced, be predicted with accuracy. This is an area that will be discussed furthered
in chapter two in the discussion on the English Experience.

In discussing the drawbacks of granting journalistic privilege the LRC points out the
risk that ‘unscrupulous journalist might be tempted to publish exaggerated or even
imagined information or allegations, since he or she would be able to attribute their
provenance to an unidentifiable source.’ It also highlights the potential threat of ‘an
unscrupulous informant [who] could equally whisper exaggerated or false
information in the ear of a journalist without fear of discovery.’ 18

It is contended that these are valid concerns and, thus, any law that exempts
journalists from revealing their sources of information to the courts must be countered
by placing restrictions on the circumstances when such sources can be used. This
argument forms the basis for chapter four where it is discussed at length.

The 1991 consultation paper ends with the rather weak assertion that an argument in
favour of a journalistic privilege based on the public's right to know is self-defeating
since, ‘if an allegation of serious misconduct is made in a newspaper, but the
allegation cannot be adequately investigated because the source of the information is

18

Ibid.
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withheld, the publisher is in effect asserting the public's 'right to know' on the one
hand and denying it on the other’. 19

It is contended that this argument is invalid as the identity of the informant is seldom
necessary in order to investigate wrongdoing. Take for example the case of Granada
Television journalist Susan O’Keeffe who was prosecuted for refusing to disclose her
sources for the programme Where’s the Beef’ to the Beef Tribunal 20 . The programme
exposed irregularities in the Irish beef industry and led to the establishment of the
Beef Tribunal to investigate the abuses. The journalist’s refusal to name her source
informant only impeded the Tribunal’s investigation into the source of the leaked
information. The public had a right to know of the corrupt practices and who was
responsible and not who brought the issue to light. Ms O’Keeffe’s revelations led to
the subsequent investigation and she was only able to inform the public in this way by
promising anonymity to her source.

The LRC revisited the topic once more in its 1994 Final Report on Contempt of
Court. In its final recommendation the Commission remained of the view that it
would be unacceptable for a court ‘to be deprived of evidence which might be
necessary to do justice between the parties in a particular case.’ 21

19

Note 17 at page 246.
Goodman International v. Hamilton [1992 No. 375 JR]: Although her evidence was to a tribunal and
not a court of law, under the Tribunal of Inquiry Acts 1921-79 contempt of a tribunal could be treated
as if it were contempt of the High Court. The Acts also made it an offence to refuse to answer any
question ‘to which the tribunal may legally require an answer’ or to refuse to supply any documents ‘in
his power or control’ legally required by the tribunal’. These Acts do not provide any exemption or
defense for journalists or any other person in such a case.
21
Note 13 at page 20.
20
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The Commission found that that the paramount interest of the public in the
administration of justice must take precedence over the public interest in freedom of
information.

The minority favoured legislation similar to the English section 10, but with a stricter
test of 'necessity'. They recommended that the court should not be permitted to order
disclosure unless it is established that disclosure is clearly necessary to prevent
injustice, or in the interests of national security or to prevent disorder to crime. Their
reason for supporting this approach was that it gave appropriate, though admittedly
not absolute, recognition to the public interest in the protection of journalistic sources.
They drew attention, in particular, to the following passage from the Report of the
European Court of Human Rights in the Goodwin case:

The Commission considers that protection of the sources from which
journalists derive information is an essential means of enabling the press to
perform its important function of ‘public watchdog’ in a democratic society. If
journalists could be compelled to reveal their sources, this would make it
much more difficult for them to obtain information and as a consequence, to
inform the public about matters of public interest. The right to freedom of
expression, ..., therefore requires that any such compulsion must be limited to
exceptional circumstances where vital public or individual interests are at
stake. 22

Contempt under the spotlight

The previously mentioned O’Keeffe case brought the issue of journalists’ sources
came to the fore in Ireland in 1994. Ms O’Keeffe garnered much public support when
22

Ibid.
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prosecuted for refusing to reveal her source. As a result, media attention focused on
the lack of protection in Irish law for journalists and their sources. Subsequently, two
Private Members’ Bills were introduced. Section 43 (2) of the Defamation Bill 1995
provided that the onus of proving that disclosure was necessary in the interests of
justice or national security or for the prevention of crime ‘shall rest with the
prosecution’. In addition, the Contempt Bill of the same year, which was introduced
solely to deal with the problem of sources, provided in section 2:
No court or tribunal of inquiry established by law may require a person to
disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose,
the source of information contained in a publication for which he is
responsible, unless it be estimated to the satisfaction of the court or tribunal
that such disclosure is necessary to protect or vindicate the constitutional right
of the individual or to protect the security of the State 23 .

However, the Contempt Bill was never introduced into law and contempt of court
remains wholly a common law offence in this country.

Ireland after Goodwin:

In 1996, the English law on protection of sources was examined by the European
Court of Human Rights in the case of Goodwin v United Kingdom 24 , a case that is
further discussed in the next chapter. The court criticised the approach of the English
courts and stressed that failing to give adequate protection to journalists’ sources
could breach the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the
Convention.

23
24

Contempt of Court Bill, (1995).
[1996] 22 EHRR 123.
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The ruling in Goodwin had repercussions on English law but its influence was also
felt in Ireland, where it was used as persuasive authority in the case of Barry O’Kelly,
a journalist with the Star newspaper, who refused to reveal his sources when called as
a witness in a civil action in the Dublin Circuit Court. As a result of the European
Court’s decision, the judge held that it was not necessary for the journalist to reveal
his source and he was, thus, not in contempt of court. 25

The Goodwin ruling may also have influenced the decision in Gray v the Minster for
Justice 26 where Quirke J used an approach that avoided ordering the journalist to
disclose his source. The case involved a newspaper article based on information
alleged to have been leaked by An Garda Síochána. Mr Keane, the journalist, wrote a
story about the Grays, who had been providing temporary accommodation for a
relative who had been released from prison after serving a sentence for sexual
offences. The article accused the couple of ‘harbouring a sex offender.’ The journalist
testified that he had received an anonymous phone call from a woman, who told him
that a serious sex offender was living in the town.

When asked in court if he had spoken to a member or members of An Garda Síochána
he refused to answer. He stated that he could not do so because his answer might
identify the source or sources of his information. He claimed that he had a duty to
protect his sources at all times. When asked if he could exclude members of the
Gardaí as a source or sources of his verification he refused to do so, again claiming
that he had an obligation not to disclose the source of his information.

25

26

McGonagle, M., note 9 at page 193.
[2007] IEHC 52.
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When asked if the words which he had published stating that ‘Gardaí are not
commenting in any way about this case’ were true, he answered ‘Yes’.
When asked ‘did they ever comment to you?’ He replied ‘I can’t answer that
question’.

The judge took an approach which avoided disclosure, finding on the balance of
probabilities in light of the evidence and Mr Keane’s refusal to exclude members of
the gardai as the source of information, ‘that the information and verification which
gave rise to the publication of Mr. Keane’s article came from a member or members
of An Garda Síochána.’

However, he also but also expressed skepticism about the existence of the privilege,
stating Mr Keane sought to ‘invoke a questionable privilege in support of his refusal’.

The most recent case concerning journalists’ sources and non-disclosure is that of two
Irish Times journalists, Geraldine Kennedy and Colm Keena 27 . Here the Court
focused entirely on the Convention aspects and found that there was a principle of
non-disclosure, although in the context that the parties did not dispute this. The facts
of the case are as follows: In September 2007, Keena, the Public Affairs
Correspondent, and Kennedy, the newspaper’s editor, were summoned to appear
before the Mahon tribunal, a tribunal of inquiry set up to examine payments made to
Taoiseach Bertie Ahern while he was Minister for Finance.

27

Judge Mahon and Others v Keena and Kennedy [2007] IEHC 348.
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The High Court ordered the two journalists to appear before the Mahon tribunal to
disclose the source of an article about financial payments to Mr. Ahern. The
proceedings arose from publication in The Irish Times in September 2006, of an
article written by Mr Keena and entitled: ‘Tribunal examines payments to Taoiseach’.
The article was based on information contained in a letter from the tribunal to
businessman David McKenna, one of a group of 12 businessmen who made payments
totaling £38,500 to Mr Ahern in 1993 and 1994. The letter was sent to Mr Keena.

Both journalists were summoned before the tribunal but refused to provide documents
or answer questions that might identify the source. Ms Kennedy told the tribunal the
documents had been destroyed. She also defended publication of the article, arguing
that it concerned a matter of ‘legitimate and significant public interest’. The High
Court found in favour of the tribunal and ordered Ms Kennedy and Mr Keena to
comply with an order to appear in Dublin Castle to answer questions about the source
of the information. It also warned that failure to comply with a High Court order ‘can
amount to a contempt of court’.

The ruling was delivered by President of the High Court, Mr Justice Richard Johnson,
It said the court was satisfied that there is ‘no doubt’ that the material sent to The Irish
Times was ‘leaked’ and that the tribunal ‘did not in any way’ authorise the release.

It noted that the tribunal, which relied on confidentiality to conduct its work,
contended that the restriction of freedom of expression was:

…necessary in a democratic society…for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence. We are satisfied…that the documents had

16

about them the attributes of confidentiality and the tribunal was entitled to
impose an obligation of confidentiality in respect of them on the designated
recipient of the document and all others who came into possession of it or
them,’ the ruling said. 28

While accepting that a ‘free press’ was an essential organ in a democratic society, the
tribunal said ‘journalists are not above the law. Neither are they entitled to usurp the
function of the court as happened here. 29

The ruling noted that Ms Kennedy and Mr Keena had argued that any risk of
disclosure of the identity of sources gave rise to a ‘chilling’ effect as far as the flow of
information to newspapers was concerned. They also argued that if they were seen to
be willing to disclose their sources, their reputations would be destroyed and their
capacity to work as journalists would be ‘grossly impaired or utterly destroyed’.

However, the court found that the source in this case could not be identified by
examining the original documents, as they had been destroyed. It said:

The only additional information that can be revealed by the defendants is
whether or not the version or copy of the letter seen by them had the tribunal's
letter heading on it or whether it was signed. In all probability, having regard
to the fact that the documents are now destroyed, the most that can be
achieved by way of answers to questions proposed to be asked by the tribunal
of the defendants is to indicate that as a matter of probability the tribunal was
not the source of the leak. 30

The court therefore found that the journalists' privilege against disclosure of sources
is:

28

Note 27.
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
29
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….overwhelmingly outweighed by the pressing social need to preserve public
confidence in the tribunal and as there is no other means by which this can be
done other than the enquiry undertaken by the tribunal, we are of opinion that
the test 'necessary in a democratic society' is satisfied.

The decision by the tribunal to compel the two journalists to answer questions, which
could potentially identify their source, is problematic given that it was information
obtained from confidential sources in the course of investigatory journalism that saw
the tribunal of inquiry established in the first place. Moreover, despite being ordered
to respond to the Tribunals questions, both journalists have asserted that they will not
jeopardise their journalistic integrity by disclosing such information, regardless of the
threat of contempt charges.

While it can be argued that the courts will not require journalists to reveal their
sources in all circumstances, it is contended that the current law on contempt is so
unclear as to make it impossible for journalists to know when they can guarantee
anonymity without fear of prosecution. Despite the LRC’s contrary findings, it is
asserted that it is necessary to introduce statutory protection for journalists to provide
immunity from disclosure. While legislation on journalistic privilege is desirable, this
thesis contends that following Britain’s lead tout court will not leave Irish journalists
in a position that is substantially clearer than that which exists presently. This
assertion is made in light of the flaws with the English legislation which are discussed
in the next chapter.

18
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The English Experience

Lord Hoffman: ‘There is no question of balancing freedom of speech against other
interests. It is a trump card which always wins.’ 31

Contempt was placed on a statutory footing in England in 1981 to give effect to the
ECHR ruling in Sunday Times v UK 32 in which it was held that the granting of an
injunction preventing the newspaper from publishing an article the drug thalidomide
and its effect on unborn children infringed on its right to freedom of expression
guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.

The Contempt of Court Act provides qualified protection against disclosure for
journalists. Section 10 states:

No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of
contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained
in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the
satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice
or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.
Section 10 appears to offer a strong prima facie protection for the media. Indeed, in
early cases the results for journalists seemed promising. For example, in AG v
Lundin 33 a journalist was held not to be in contempt for refusing to reveal his source,
because the ‘revelation of [the] source would not have assisted the prosecution’s case
and was therefore relevant but unnecessary in the interests of justice. However, the
‘interests of justice’ exception was given a wider interpretation in later cases 34 and is

31

R v Central Independent Television Plc [1994] 3 All ER 641, 652.
(1979-80) 2 EHRR 245, 26.
33
(1982) 75 Cr App R 90, 101 (DC).
34
British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd, [1981] 1 All ER 435.
32
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singularly the greatest flaw in the legislation. 35 Thus, this chapter will examine the
case law only as it pertains to this exception.

In 1996, the English law on protection of sources was examined by the European
Court of Human Rights in the case of Goodwin v United Kingdom 36 , a case which
will be further discussed later. The court criticised the approach of the English courts
and stressed that failing to give adequate protection to journalists’ sources could
breach the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.

The court further stressed that disclosure orders could only be justified if there was an
overriding public interest in the source being revealed. At the time, Goodwin was
heralded as a landmark decision in the protection of journalists’ sources. However,
subsequent cases have proven otherwise.

That said, the ECHR ruling did pave the way for further development at a European
level where in 2000 the Committee of Ministers Recommendation on the rights of
journalists not to disclose their sources of information stipulated that ‘domestic law
and practice in member states should provide for explicit and clear protection of the
rights of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source.’ 37

Domestically, English courts tended to give the term ‘interest of justice’ a wide
definition. In fact, the phrase did not appear in the original Bill, which only removed
immunity from disclosure where it was necessary in the interest of national security or
35
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the prevention of disorder or crime. As Sallie Spilsbury 38 points out, the interests of
justice exception can be traced back to the committee stage of the Bill. Lord
Hailsham, the then Lord Chancellor, recommended that an exception be Introduced
where disclosure was vital ‘for the administration of justice’. His exception was
intended to apply to legal proceedings where it was necessary for the complainant to
know the source in order to make their case. However, instead of limiting the
exception to immunity where it was necessary for the administration of justice, the
drafter used the words ‘interests of justice’. 39 The vague and undefined nature of the
term led Lord Hailsham to remark: ‘What are the interests of justice? I suggest they
are as long as the judge’s foot.’ 40

The Lord Chancellor’s words proved prophetic with decisions on disclosure in
England tending to be decided against journalists due to the wide scope of the
exception. In Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers 41 Lord Diplock,
in an obiter statement, sought to limit the term, expressing the view that ‘the
expression ‘justice’ in section 10 of the Act of 1981 is not used in a general sense but
in the technical sense of the administration of justice in the course of legal
proceedings in a court of law.’ 42

He went on to say that, where the only or

predominant purpose of a legal action was to obtain possession of a document in
order to identify the source of a leak, he found it impossible to envisage any case
where it was be necessary in the interests of justice to order disclosure. His comments
mirror Lord Hailsham’s original intention when drafting the Bill.

38
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The Guardian case involved the publishing of a leaked confidential memo from the
Secretary of State for Defence regarding the arrival of Cruise missiles in Britain.
Disclosure in this case was deemed necessary in the interests of national security and,
as such, Lord Diplock’s comments were obiter dictum.

Lord Diplock’s comments were ignored in X Ltd v Morgan Grampian, 43 a key case in
highlighting how broad a reading could be applied to the interests of justice
exception. The case arose when Bill Goodwin, a trainee journalist received
unsolicited information that a company, Tetra Ltd, was experiencing financial
difficulties. When he contacted the company to confirm the information, they
immediately sought an order seeking the disclosure of the identity of the source of
this information. The order was granted primarily on the ground of the threat of
severe financial damage to the computer software company, and consequently to the
livelihood of its employees. Goodwin refused to disclose his notes, which would have
revealed his source, and appealed the case all the way to the House of Lords where he
was fined £5000 for contempt. The court said disclosure could be considered
necessary in the interest of justice where it was necessary to enable someone to
‘exercise important legal rights and to protect themselves from serious legal
wrongs.’ 44

In deciding whether this was the case, the court said the relevant issues were ‘the
nature of the information obtained from the source.’ 45 The court said the greater the
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legitimate public interest in the information, the greater the importance of protecting
the source. In addition, the manner in which the source obtained the information was
deemed to be ‘another and perhaps more significant factor which will very much
affect the importance of protecting the source.’ 46 Information that appeared to the
court to have been obtained legitimately would enhance the importance of protecting
the source, the court said. Conversely, if the information appeared to have been
obtained illegally, the importance of protecting the source would be diminished, it
was held, ‘unless, of course, this factor is counterbalanced by a clear public interest
in publication of the information.’ 47 The court gave the example of a source acting to
expose wrongdoing. The House of Lords, in rejecting the journalist’s claim had
engaged in a balancing exercise to determine whether the disclosure was ‘in the
interests of justice.’

Mr Goodwin brought his case to the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled
that forcing him to disclose his source was in breach of the Article 10 right to freedom
of expression. The company’s interest in eliminating the threat of financial damage
was held to be insufficient to outweigh the vital public interest in the protection of the
journalist’s source. The court also ruled that failing to give adequate protection to
sources undermined the role of the press as a public watchdog.

Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions of press
freedom…Without such protection sources may be deterred from assisting the
press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result, the vital
public watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the
press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely
affected. 48
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The court ruled the public interest in protecting Mr Goodwin’s source outweighed
Tetra’s interest in identifying the person who leaked the financial information.

The Goodwin ruling was paid lip service in Camelot Group Plc v Centaur
Communications Ltd 49 three years later though the outcome deviated from the
European Court’s finding. The case involved the organisation authorised to run the
national lottery, Camelot. A set of their draft year-end accounts was leaked, five days
in advance of publication, to a journalist employed by Centaur. On the basis of the
information contained in the leaked material, the journalist wrote an article focusing
on large payouts which the directors of Camelot were said to have awarded
themselves, whilst the funds allocated to good causes decreased. Camelot sought the
return of the documents in order to assist in identifying the source of the leak, citing
possible damage to their business activities and the potential danger of other
confidential information being disclosed.

Centaur confirmed they had no intention of using, publishing or otherwise
disseminating any of the material contained in the draft accounts and were content for
the documentation to be destroyed. Their concern was the protection of their source.

However, Mr Justice Kay took the view that the public interest in enabling Camelot to
discover a disloyal employee who leaked confidential information was greater than
the public interest in protecting in protecting sources because the disloyal employee
posed an ‘ongoing threat’ to the company. The court said this was not a whistleblowing case and the information leaked by the source and published by the
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defendants would have become legitimately available to the public some five days
later. Justice Kay asserted:

Rather than serving a public interest, it would appear that the prior and
premature disclosure and publication of the information served a private of the
source or the defendants. ‘ 50
Justice Thorpe dismissed the subsequent appeal and refused stay.
The Camelot ruling was made shortly before the introduction of the Human Rights
Act of 1998 which, at section 12, 51 affirmed the weight courts ought to give freedom
expression, which was first laid down at European level in section 10 of the 1950
Convention on Human Rights. Sub-section four of the 1998 Act requires courts to
have ‘particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of
expression’ and to the ‘relevant privacy code’ if the proceedings relate to ‘journalistic
material’. In theory it should have had profoundly changed the application of S10/

John v Express Newspapers 52 , a case involving famous singer Elton John, followed
the introduction of the Act, which may have been responsible for the ‘media-friendly’
outcome at the appeal stage. In the case the importance of upholding guarantees of
anonymity to the profession of journalism and subsequently the free flow of
information was acknowledged. The facts were as follows:

a draft document

regarding litigation the singer was involved in was removed from counsel’s chambers
50
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and made its way into the hands of a journalist. The claimants sought an order under
section 10 of the Contempt Act requiring the journalist, her editor and the newspaper
company, to disclose the identity of the person who had provided the draft advice.
The judge found that the source could not be identified by way of an internal enquiry
easily and concluded that disclosure was necessary in the interests of justice because
of the need to protect legal professional privilege.

The decision was overturned on appeal. The court held that clients needed to be able
to consult their lawyers with assurance that their confidence was not at risk of being
betrayed and that, if that important principle was in danger of being damaged,
disclosure of a journalist's source might be necessary to protect the interests of justice
pursuant to section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act.

However, the court ruled that, before the courts required journalists to’ break what
they regarded as a most important professional obligation to protect a source,’
sufficient effort must be made by the plaintiff to find out the source of the leak before
going to court. It was further held that the judge had attached insufficient importance
to the failure of counsel's chambers to discover the source of the leak and too much
significance to the threat that that single incident posed to legal confidentiality. Thus,
it was held the claimants had not established that disclosure of the journalist's source
was necessary in the interests of justice and, even if they had, the judge should have
exercised his discretion to refuse disclosure. In reaching the decision the judge said:

Section 10 imposes on the judge a two-stage process of reasoning. First, he
has to decide whether disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice etc. If
he is not so satisfied then he cannot order disclosure. If he is so satisfied, he
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still is left with the task of deciding whether as a matter of discretion he should
order disclosure. The second stage involves weighing the conflicting interests
involved; the need for disclosure on the one hand and the need for protection
on the other.
In Ashworth Security Hospital v MGN Ltd 53 the issue of disclosure of journalists’
sources was revisited. The case centered on the medical records of ‘Moors Murder’
Ian Brady who had killed several children during the 1960s. The Mirror newspaper
got hold of details of Brady’s treatment while held in Ashworth Security Hospital.
The newspaper published at story, containing verbatim extracts from the patient's
medical records, which revealed Brady was on hunger strike in protest at his
treatment and disclosed the details of how the hospital was dealing with it, including
force-feeding Brady. The paper had got the information from a journalist who had
been paid for it but did not know where this journalist had gotten the information
from. The hospital went to court to compel the Mirror to reveal its source. Just as Bill
Goodwin’s case had, the case was appealed all the way to the House of Lords and it
was, once again, ruled that the source should be disclosed because it was in ‘the
interest of justice’ that someone leaking confidential information from hospital
records should be identified and punished by the hospital in to prevent further leaks
from that person and deter others from doing the same:

The care of patients at Ashworth is fraught with difficulty and danger. The
disclosure of the patient's records increases that difficulty and danger and to
deter the same or similar wrongdoing in the future it was essential that the
source should be identified and punished. 54
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Following the ruling, the journalist, Robin Ackroyd came forward ad identified
himself voluntarily. However, he refused to divulge his sources and the hospital took
him to court to compel disclosure. In Mersey NHS Trust v Ackroyd (No 2) 55 the Court
of Appeal upheld the decision of the lower court, which refused to order him to reveal
his sources. It was held that Tugendhat J had not erred in ruling that although the
hospital had a legitimate interest in discovering the source, this was outweighed by
the public interest in journalists protecting their sources. On the evidence the judge
said Mr Ackroyd was a responsible journalist whose purpose was to act in the public
interest. It was also noted that it had become clear that the original source had not
been acting for financial gain and there had been no subsequent leaks.
The appellant court held:

Weighing all of the factors, the judge held that it had not been convincingly
established that there was still a pressing social need that the sources be identified
and refused the order sought.

As can be seen in the above case law, in deciding cases under section 10 of the 1981
Act the courts have engaged in a balancing exercise that weighs the need for
disclosure on the one hand and the need for protection on the other. The introduction
of the Human Rights Act 1998 should have had a profound effect on the way s10 is
applied, shifting the method of determining applications for disclosure orders from a
two-stage process to determining if the order can be made as a matter of fact and then
exercising discretion as to whether or not to make it to one of judgment, or as
Costigan 56 asserts in her paper on protection of journalists’ sources, whether
disclosure should be ordered is [now] a matter of law, albeit influenced by the facts.
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The HRA gives the journalist a right to protect his/her source, which the court is
under a duty to observe, by making Article 10 the trump right which prevails over
attempts to discover the identity of a source under Section 10. Much progress has
been made, as seen by the Akroyd and Express rulings, but it is contended that the
courts have not fully acknowledged this primacy.

We must now examine some of the factors taken into consideration by the court when
deciding to if orders for disclosure should be made.

It is evident from the above case law that the courts in Britain tended to place greater
importance on the potential damage that may be caused to companies or the
government if the informant’s identity is not revealed than on the ‘potential and
abstract’ damage caused to the free flow of information. 57 This may well be due to
the vague concept of press freedom and the difficulty in quantifying the harm done by
compelling journalist to reveal his/her sources of information. As Palmer assets, the
harm to the public interest caused by the loss of free flow of information cannot by
definition be quantified. ‘The loss is hypothetical: there is no way of assessing what
sources would have come forward if preservation of anonymity was more certain.’ 58
Conversely, the potential financial loss to a company caused by a whistleblower or
disloyal employee may be portrayed with relative ease and it is a factor that the courts
seem willing to give considerable weight to.

A further flaw in the British legislation is the weight courts tend to give to the
behaviour of the source, focusing on whether the individual is worthy of the Section
57
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10 protection rather than freedom of expression as a concept. In Morgan Grampian,
Lord Bridge identified the manner in which the source obtained the information as a
significant factor in the decision whether to order disclosure.

It appears to the court that the information was obtained legitimately this will
enhance the importance of protecting the source. Conversely, if it appears that
the information was obtained illegally, this will diminish the importance o
protecting the source, unless, of course, this factor is counterbalanced by a
clear public interest in the publication of the information, as in the classic case
where the source has acted for the purpose of exposing iniquity. 59

Informants, particularly those working for large businesses or the government, tend to
be categorised as disgruntled, disloyal employees, acting out of malice rather than
concerned individuals who wish to expose corrupt practices. As seen by Mr Justice
Kay’s comments in the Camelot case 60 , exposing those who leak damaging
information to the media tends to be treated as serving the public interest more than
protecting press freedom. This is against the spirit of the legislation, which was
initially touted as a ‘profound’ change to the protection afforded to journalists’
sources and contrary to the ECtHR ruling. The interests protected by Section 10 are
not those of the source, but those relating to press freedom. The vital question for the
court is not whether the source merits protection, but whether the journalist should
lose the immunity granted by Section 10. This was identified by Justice Laws, the
then Lord Justice, in the Ashworth Hospital case, who said the curb placed on press
by ordering journalists to reveal their sources is not: ‘to the least degree lessened or
abrogated by the fact…that the source is a disloyal and greedy individual, prepared
for money to betray his employer’s confidences. 61
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In addition the courts in Britain have placed emphasis on the conduct of the journalist
when deciding whether or not to grant immunity. Of examples beginning with Lord
Diplock, who, in Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers Ltd, 62
referred to the newspaper’s editor as having behaved responsibly throughout the
series of events that led to the disclosure order application. Slade L.J. in the Insider
Dealing case observed; ‘responsible journalists should be entitled to protect their
sources of information’. 63 In the Special Hospitals Service Authority v Hyde, Sir Peter
Pain referred to the responsible way in which the journalist dealt with the information,
making no important or serious disclosure. 64 Most recently in the Ashworth hospital
cases the conduct and standing of the journalist received significant attention in
determining whether a he should be ordered to disclose the identity of an intermediary
who provided leaked information about a patient. At the full hearing on Ashworth
Hospital’s application for disclosure order, Tugendhat J noted: ‘the circumstance and
conduct of the journalist are potentially relevant to the judgment that has to be made
before an order of sources can be made.’ 65 The judgment ends with the observation
that the journalist involved was ‘a responsible journalist whose purpose was to act in
the public interest.’ 66

Costigan asserts that the reason for such emphasis on the conduct of the journalist
stems from the common law position whereby the presumption against disclosure of
media sources related only to interim proceedings in defamation actions. In such cases
the diligence of the journalist was a valid consideration. 67 However, unlike in
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defamation actions the journalist is not the wrongdoer and, in the majority of Section
10 cases, the veracity of the published material is not at issue.

Thus, although the law of contempt has been placed on a statutory footing in Britain,
providing qualified immunity from disclosure orders, the wide interpretation given to
the exceptions in Section 10, particularly the ‘in the interests of justice’ element have
rendered its protection weak and unclear. Any such legislation in Ireland must avoid
these pitfalls by steering clear of nebulous phrases that encompass all manner of
circumstances and, when given a wide interpretation, serve to abrogate the protection
intended by the legislation.
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Chapter three: The
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Kirsten Mitchell: The Scandinavian countries have particularly strong source
protection laws. In Sweden, for example, the protection of sources is so absolute
that a journalist is bound legally from revealing sources who request anonymity.
Those who don't may be prosecuted at the behest of the source… 68

The previous two chapters made a case for the implementation of journalistic
privilege to protect sources and examined the law as it exists in Ireland and the UK,
arguing that despite introducing statutory protection for journalists, the law in
England has failed to offer comprehensive protection for confidential informants. This
chapter seeks to examine alternative statutory models and the protection they offer
journalists.

Federal Law

The law in the United States will be first examined. As previously stated, the First
Amendment of the US Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press.
The leading case on protection of journalists’ sources is Branzburg v Hayes 69 , in
which it was held that the First Amendment of the US Constitution’s protection of
free speech does not grant journalists the privilege to refuse to divulge names of
confidential sources. However, laws providing protection for journalist confidentiality
have been adopted by a large number of states, a sample of which will be discussed
later. Branzburg is a confusing and ambiguous decision. In it, the court was divided,
with four of the nine judges dissenting. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion that
created a majority but it is this opinion that many judges appear to have relied upon in
68
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holding that Branzburg, in fact, created a qualified privilege for journalists to protect
their sources. He said:

‘[reporters are not without] constitutional rights with respect to the gathering
of news or in safeguarding their sources ... no harassment of newsmen will be
tolerated. If a newsman believes that a grand jury investigation is not being
conducted in good faith he is not without remedy. Indeed, if a newsman is
called upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous
relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he has some other reason
to believe that his testimony implicated confidential source relationships
without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the Court
on a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered.’

In other words, although Justice Powell ultimately voted with the majority, a large
proportion of his opinion appears to agree with the dissenting opinion.

In the case’s immediate aftermath, courts held that the First Amendment afforded no
protection for journalist’s sources, however, gradually they began drawing on the
minority opinion in concluding that a qualified privilege was permitted in some cases.
The balancing test favoured by Justice Stewart in his Branzburg dissent tends to be
favoured by the courts when balancing the freedom of expression against the interests
of those seeking disclosure. 70 As a result of the Branzburg decision, there is
considerable doubt as to whether journalists may be compelled to disclose
confidential sources under the First Amendment.

Thus, while journalists have no absolute constitutional privilege to refuse to disclose
information they consider confidential, federal and state judges have frequently
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recognised the public interest in a free flow of news, established in the First
Amendment, and the contribution that confidential sources can make to that flow.

State Shield Laws

Partly as a result of Branzburg, most states have passed shield laws to create a
privilege against disclosure for journalists. To examine each state law is beyond the
scope of this thesis so a sample of three will be discussed; California, Illinois and
New York, as each of the three provide varying degrees of protection ranging from
absolute to qualified, for a narrow category of persons.

The discussion commences with the California shield law 71 which appears to offer
absolute privilege to journalists, that is,

a privilege that cannot be taken away

irrespective of any competing interests. However, in SCI-Sacramento Inc v Superior
Court (People) 72 it was held that

the provision only provides immunity from

contempt charges and is not a general privilege regarding disclosures. The shield law
states:

71
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A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or
employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication,
or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has been
so connected or employed, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a
judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any other body having
the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose, in any
proceeding as defined in Section 901, the source of any information
procured while so connected or employed for publication in a
newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing
to disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in
gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to
the public. 73

The law protects a person ‘connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine
or other periodical publication. In O’Grady v Superior Courts 74 , a case involving an
online news magazine about Apple Computers, it was held that the shield law applies
to persons gathering news for dissemination to the public regardless of whether the
medium is print or online. However, the law only protects newsgatherers who engage
in ‘open and deliberate publication on a news-oriented website of news gathered by
that site’s operators’.

California’s shield law also protects several types of information, including
unpublished material obtained or prepared in the process of gathering information for
communication to the public. This information may be protected from disclosure
regardless of whether or not it was obtained in confidence. Regarding informants, the
law protects the identity of sources, even if they are not confidential, and information
that might lead to their identity. The strength of the shield law’s protection depends
upon the sort of legal case and whether the person from whom the information is
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sought is a party to the proceedings. The protection ranges from absolute in civil cases
to nil when the newsgatherer is a party to the proceedings. In criminal cases the
strength of the protection depends on whether the a prosecutor or criminal defendant
is seeking the information, with prosecutors rarely able to overcome the shield. Thus,
it is arguable that the all purportedly absolute shield laws may be defeated by the
defendant’s right to a fair trial.

Illinois

The shield law of Illinois 75 provides for qualified privilege, protecting non-disclosure
of sources unless ‘ all other available sources of information have been exhausted
and disclosure of the information sought is essential to the protection of the public
interest involved’. 76

The law states: No court may compel any person to disclose the source of any
information obtained by a reporter except as provided in the other provisions of the
shield law. 77 The protection afforded to journalists under the shield law of the state of
Illinois is less comprehensive than that in California. The protection the privilege
provides only extends to those who fall within the law’s definition of a ‘reporter’ and
is dependent on the type of medium for which they work.
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They are defined as follows:

(a) ‘Reporter’ means any person regularly engaged in the business of
collecting, writing or editing news for publication through a news medium on
a fulltime or parttime basis . . . .
(b) ‘News medium’ means any newspaper or other periodical issued at regular
intervals whether in print or electronic format and having a general
circulation; a news service whether in print or electronic format; a radio
station; a television station; a television network; a community antenna
television service; and any person or corporation engaged in the making of
news reels or other motion picture news for public showing.
(c) ‘Source’ means the person or means from or through which the news or
information was obtained.

Illinois's shield law protects the sources of information, which the law defines as ‘the
person or means from or through which the news or information was obtained.’ The
law applies to both human sources and documentary sources, including information
obtained in the newsgathering process, including information not obtained in return
for a promise of confidentiality. For example, in People v. Slover 78 , an Illinois court
held that a reporter's unpublished photograph depicting police performing a search
was a protected ‘source’ within the meaning of the statute. Moreover, a journalist
does not need to promise a human source confidentiality in order to avail of the
shield's protection.

Until recently, it appeared that federal courts in the Seventh Circuit, which
encompasses Illinois, recognised a qualified privilege based on the First Amendment.
The courts recognised this privilege applied to both the identity of confidential
sources and unpublished information - whether confidential or nonconfidential collected during newsgathering. Before ordering disclosure of covered information,
78
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the courts applied a balancing test considering the media's interests in protecting the
information, the relevance of the material sought, and whether the source was
confidential.

However, a relatively recent case, involving an Irish defendant, McKevitt v
Pallasch 79 , has cast serious doubt on the continued validity of the reporter's privilege
in the Seventh Circuit. Michael McKevitt was an alleged Irish Republican Army
activist being tried in Ireland on charges of directing terrorism and belonging to a
banned organisation. One of the witnesses against him, David Rupert, was a purported
FBI informant with ties to the IRA. A group of Illinois journalists writing a biography
conducted and taped several interviews with the Mr Rupert during their research.
Invoking federal law, Mr McKevitt asked an Illinois court to compel the journalists to
turn over the tapes as he believed they would be useful to him in the crossexamination of Mr Rupert.. The authors refused, claiming the Branzburg ruling
protected their unpublished material from disclosure. After the trial court rejected the
journalists’ claim, the writers appealed to the 7th Circuit.

The 7th Circuit unanimously affirmed the trial court's decision. Writing the opinion
in the case, Judge Richard Posner recognised the decision in Branzburg was
somewhat difficult to interpret because, as previously mentioned, Justice Powell
voted with the majority but wrote a concurring opinion that seemingly sided with the
dissent. While other courts found a newsgatherers’ privilege in this ambiguity, Posner
J refused to do so, concluding instead that Powell J’s concurrence should be construed
narrowly.
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New York

According to a 1984 case 80 , New York has :

long provided one of the most hospitable climates for he free exchange of
ideas…. It is consistent with that tradition for
New York to provide broad protections, often broader than those provided
elsewhere, to those engaged in publishing and particularly to those performing
the sensitive role of gathering and disseminating news of public events.
New York's Shield Law provides an absolute privilege with respect to confidential
information, and a qualified privilege for nonconfidential information.
No fine or imprisonment may be imposed against a person for any
refusal to disclose information privileged by the provisions of this
section. 81

However, the state’s shield law covers only a narrow category of people. In general, it
only offers protection to ‘professional journalists’ who earn money from
newsgathering for a traditional media source. Journalists who qualify for its
protection cannot disclose information obtained to people who do not work for the
same organisation as them, or they risk losing the shield's protection.

New York state courts recognise a qualified ‘reporter's privilege’ based on the US
Constitution and the New York Constitution but New York state courts do not
recognise any common law privilege for newsgatherers.
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According to the statute:

(6) "Professional journalist" shall mean one who, for gain or
livelihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing, collecting, writing,
editing, filming, taping or photographing of news intended for a
newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association or wire service or
other professional medium which has as one of its regular functions
the processing and researching of news intended for dissemination to
the public; such person shall be someone performing said function
either as a regular employee or as one otherwise professionally
affiliated for gain or livelihood with such medium of communication.
(7) "Newscaster" shall mean a person who, for gain or livelihood, is
engaged in analyzing, commenting on or broadcasting, news by radio or
television transmission.
(8) "News" shall mean written, oral, pictorial, photographic, or
electronically recorded information or communication concerning local,
national or worldwide events or other matters of public concern or
public interest or affecting the public welfare. 82

Federal courts in the 2nd Circuit Court, which encompasses New York, recognise a
qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the US Constitution
and the common law. The level of protection depends on whether the journalist
obtained the information in question in exchange for a promise of confidentiality.

The New York shield law protects the identity of sources and information collected in
the course of newsgathering. The journalist does not need to have spoken with the
source or obtained the information in confidence to obtain protection, but the level of
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protection is higher in case where they have. Disclosure of information has significant
negative consequences for protection under the shield law. 83

New York's shield law has two tiers of protection. The first tier covers journalists who
promised his/her source confidentiality or obtained information in return for a
promise of confidentiality. In this circumstance, the shield is absolute and courts may
not order a journalist to reveal it under any circumstances. The absolute protection
applies equally whether the information is sought in a civil or criminal case. It applies
even if the journalist is a party to the case in which information is sought. The second
level applies if the information is not confidential. In this case, the shield is qualified,
meaning that in some circumstances a court may order the journalists. to reveal the
information. 84

State courts in New York also recognise a qualified journalist’s privilege based on
the US Constitution and the New York Constitution. It covers both confidential and
non-confidential information.

The First Amendment

All three states recognise a qualified privilege for journalists’ sources under the First
Amendment, although there is some doubt over Illinois following the McKevitt case.
83
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In an interesting development in the law, the First Amendment of the US constitution
was actually used against a journalist in the landmark ruling of Cohen v Cowles
Media Company. 85 In the case a source gave information to a journalist on the
condition that his name be kept secret. The journalist promised confidentiality but his
editors overruled his decision and the sources identity was revealed. Consequently the
source sued the media company on the basis of promissory estoppel. The journalist
sought to rely on the First Amendment protection afforded to reporters, arguing it
prohibited a plaintiff from recovering damages for a newspaper’s breach of a promise
of confidentiality given to the plaintiff in exchange for information. The court
disagreed and the plaintiff was awarded $200,000 in compensation.

The US Supreme Court’s ruling is significant for the limitations it placed on news
media conduct. The court held that media organisations whose agents promise
anonymity to a source must keep their word. While the ruling was interpreted by
many a a set-back for press freedom, it is contended in this thesis that the ruling may
have actually enhanced the free flow of information. It is suggested that by requiring
the media to keep their word, potential sources who seek anonymity may be more
willing to come forward because any promise of confidentiality is legally binding. It
is further contended that using such legislation against the media, rather than
restricting the free flow of information, actually aids it by ensuring that the
commercial interests of media corporations do not circumvent the public’s right to
factual, verified news This argument will be further advanced in the next chapter
when a case for restricting the circumstances in which confidential sources can be
used will be made.

85

501 US 663 (1991).

45

Sweden
In light of the decision in Cohen v Cowles it is interesting to examine the protection
afforded to journalists’ sources in Sweden. There a journalist who reveals his or her
source without consent may be prosecuted at the behest of the source. 86 The Freedom
of the Press Act (FPA), which has constitutional status, provides for protection of
journalists sources. 87 The FPA also closely regulates executive action regarding the
media. Government officials may only make enquiries regarding media sources where
this is explicitly allowed by the FPA. 88 Generally this is only where the authorities
have reasonable grounds to believe that the source has committed treason, espionage
or a similar crime. 89 Since the editor is responsible for all crimes committed in
publishing the newspaper, the police have little justification for searches to identify
sources.

The protection afforded to journalists in Sweden by the FPA is subject to exceptions.
Courts may order source disclosure in criminal cases where the information is needed
to protect state security or where freedom of the press is not the central issue and
disclosure is justified by an overriding public or private interest. The interest of an
accused person in obtaining information relevant to establishing his or her innocence
and the interest of the police in obtaining evidence about crime are examples of such
overriding interests.
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As asserted in a 1998 briefing paper on the protection of journalists’ sources,
protection of news sources is considered to be part of ‘messenger freedom’ and is,
thus, a deeply rooted and highly valued legal tradition in Sweden, which even public
officials and persons representing powerful institutions rarely try to challenge. For
example, in 1988 a court ordered a reporter working for Dagens Nyheter, the largest
morning paper, to reveal when certain conversations with a known source had taken
place. Outraged journalists argued that this was unconstitutional and the Chancellor of
Justice, who was responsible for prosecuting the case, eventually withdrew the
question. 90

Sweden also has a Press Ombudsman's office which is run and funded independently
by the media itself. The Press Officer is appointed by a special committee, with
representatives from the Swedish Bar Association, the press and the government. All
the members of the Newspaper Publishers Association, including all the daily
newspapers in Sweden, have agreed to abide by a Code of Ethics, which sets stringent
standards concerning accuracy, privacy and rights of reply. 91 For example, provisions
one and two of the code state the following:

The role played by the mass media in society and the confidence of the
general public in these media call for accurate and objective news reports.
Be critical of news sources. Check facts as carefully as possible in the
light of the circumstances even if they have been published earlier. Allow
the reader/ listener/ viewer the possibility of distinguishing between
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statements of fact and comments. 92

These provisions are particularly important to ensuring accurate information is
disseminated, given that disclosing a source is an offence in Sweden. People who
claim they have been harmed by a violation of the Code can complain to the Press
Ombudsman, who may investigate, mediate and recommend that the Swedish Press
Council punish the offending publications. 93

The above US and Swedish examples serve to illustrate the importance placed on the
protection of the free press in these jurisdictions, in marked contrast, it is contended,
to the state of play in Ireland and the UK, where the administration of justice and the
protection of private interests tend to be given greater weight.
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Chapter Four:
Balancing
protection with
restriction
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When discussing the use of unnamed sources, Michael Gartner, the former NBC
News president, remarked: ‘Sometimes it’s a function of laziness. Sometimes it’s
competitiveness. There’s always an excuse…Both sources and reporters know
they can get by with it so they play these little games.’ 94

Attitudes towards the use of anonymous sources differ greatly between the US and
Ireland/Britain, with the American press tending to use such informants more
sparingly. In discussing anonymous sources in a US context, Shepard 95 explains that
there is a general feeling amongst editors that a heavy reliance on such sources
damages the press’ credibility. Competition was cited as the main reason for using
such informants and, for that reason, this chapter seeks to argue that legislation
restricting the circumstances in which anonymous sources can be used is not an attack
on the free press. Instead such restrictions would serve as a safeguard against unjust
attacks on reputation, unwarranted interference with the administration of justice, and
the erosion of the integrity of the profession by media organisation concerned more
with commercial gains than with informing public.

US experience

The US experience with anonymous sources provides an interesting starting point for
a discussion on the introduction of restrictions. The reluctance of the US press to use
such sources is founded in a number of high profile and embarrassing incidents, in
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which stories were fabricated by journalists seeking a better story under commercial
pressure.

The most famous example of an anonymous source is Deep Throat, an informant who
leaked secrets that helped Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl
Bernstein uncover the Watergate affair. The scandal forced the resignation of
Republican President Richard Nixon in 1974 and concerned a break-in at the offices
of the rival Democratic Party in the Watergate Building in 1972. The attempted
bugging of the building was linked to the offices of the Nixon White House and the
cover-up went all the way to the top. In 2005 the Washington Post revealed that Mark
Felt, a former top FBI official, was Deep Throat. Initially the Washington Post
reporters refused to confirm Mr Felt's identity, sticking with their 31-year promise
only to break the silence after their source's death. However, Mr Felt's family said he
deserved recognition for the risks he took and requested his identity be revealed. The
Watergate affair serves as a clear example of the value of using confidential sources
on matters of great public interest when no alternative is available.

In her article for the American Journalism Review 96 , Shepard cites a survey by Ohio
University Journalism Professor Hugh Culbertson, who surveyed more than 200 US
editors in 1979. He found that most said competition forced them to use unnamed
sources, even though 81 percent considered them inherently less believable. One-third
were ‘unhappy to a substantial degree’ with how anonymous sources were handled at
their own newspapers, and editors estimated that more than half would go on the
record if reporters pushed harder. ‘They seemed to regard unnamed attribution as a
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crutch for lazy reporters,’ Culbertson said. Shepard argues that although the research
was conducted in the 70s, ‘it’s likely the findings would be similar today’.

The issue of anonymous sources came to the fore once more in the US during the
murder trial of O.J. Simpson who stood accused of killing his ex-wife. A California
television reporter told viewers that DNA tests showed a match between blood on a
sock found in Simpson's bedroom and his former wife's blood. The link was attributed
to a source who refused to be named. A Los Angeles court judge threatened to close
Simpson's murder trial to television cameras in the wake of the controversial report.
The television station initially responded by saying that it had ‘reported accurately
the information our sources have told us.’ Several days later, the station said part of
its report was ‘in some respect, factually incorrect,’ although it did not specify what
was inaccurate. 97

As with the Madeleine McCann abduction case in the UK, which is discussed later,
pressure to be first on the Simpson case was immense. With few knowledgeable
sources speaking on the record, journalists turned on those willing to talk on a not-forattribution basis. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly it is contended, much of the
information was inaccurate and had the potential to damage the defendant’s right to a
fair trial.

97

Sharkey, J. E., Offside on O.J., American Journalism Review, December 1994,
available at http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=1583.
52

A further example of the dangers of using unattributed material the case of Janet
Cooke, a former American journalist who became infamous when it was discovered
that a Pulitzer Prize winning story that she had written for The Washington Post had
been fabricated. In an article titled Jimmy's World, which appeared in the Post on
September 29, 1980, Cooke wrote a gripping profile of the life of an eight-year-old
heroin addict, who did not, in fact, exist. Ironically, The Assistant Managing Editor of
the paper who submitted the article for a Pulitzer Prize was none other than Bob
Woodward.

Many US editors argue that having a story on the record lends credibility but, as
Shepard asserts ‘some say it's crucial for another reason: to protect against libel
charges.’ She writes: ‘Many feel that massive libel awards in the early 1980s
had more to do with changing attitudes about them.’ Citing a New York Times
attorney, the paper goes on to say unnamed sources represent one of the most serious
libel threats for news organisations. ‘When a paper is sued over a story based on
confidential sources, [he says,] "the plaintiff's lawyer will doubtless complain that
either the sources didn't exist or they shouldn't have been relied on. Juries will
generally believe that when those people never come into the room."’ 98

The dangers of using anonymous sources with regard to libel awards can be seen in
this jurisdiction also. In 2006, businessman Denis O’Brien was awarded a record
€750,000 against the Mirror Newspaper Group by 11 jurors in the High Court. The
paper had published an article which alleged a former Government minister was
going to be investigated over a payment of Ir£30,000. The newspaper based the article
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on, what it referred to as, an anonymous letter which alleged the donation came from
Mr O’Brien. The paper subsequently admitted that the article published was untrue
and defamatory of Mr O'Brien. It is contended that had steps been taken to verify the
allegation aside from relying on unattributed material, the need for litigation would
never have risen, nor would the damage the the media’s reputation.

As mentioned in the discussion of the US’ experience, anonymous sources can be a
vital tool in bringing important stories to light but they can also be used as a ‘crutch
for lazy reporters.’ 99 In order to illustrate this argument, this chapter will examine two
vastly differing cases in which confidential informants were used by news
publications.

Jameel

The discussion commences with the case of Jameel v Wallstreet Journal Europe 100 ,
the facts of which are as follows:

On 6 February 2002 the quality, broadsheet newspaper published the article headed
"Saudi Officials Monitor Certain Bank Accounts" with a smaller sub-heading "Focus
Is on Those With Potential Terrorist Ties". It was written by an Arabic-speaking
reporter with specialist knowledge of Saudi Arabia, and acknowledged the
99
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contribution of a staff writer in Washington. The gist of the article was that the Saudi
Arabian Monetary Authority, the Kingdom's central bank, was, at the request of US
law enforcement agencies, monitoring bank accounts associated with some of the
country's most prominent businessmen in a bid to prevent them from being used,
wittingly or unwittingly, for the funnelling of funds to terrorist organisations. This
information was attributed to ‘U.S. officials and Saudis familiar with the issue’. In the
second paragraph a number of companies and individuals were named, among them
‘the Abdullatif Jamil Group of companies’ who, it was stated later in the article,
‘couldn't be reached for comment’.

The article was published five monts after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, and
consequently the newpaper sought to rely on the qualified privilege laid down in
Reynolds v Times Newspapers 101 in which the common law defence of qualified
privilege in libel cases was developed to establish a public interest defence for
newspaper articles that were the product of responsible journalism. In the decision,
Lord Nicholls set out ten factors that a judge might take into consideration in deciding
whether the test of responsible journalism was met, including, for example, the tone
of the article and whether the story contained the gist of the claimant’s side of the
story. The aim was to strike a better balance between the protection of reputation and
freedom of expression, affording greater protection to free speech in cases where a
newspaper was unable or unwilling to prove the truth of a defamatory allegation. 102 In
the Jameel case, the WSJ could not prove the allegations made in the article because
the had relied on an anonymous source. However, because the journalist had gone to
considerable lengths to verify the information, the Law Lords, on appeal, ruled that
101
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Reynold’s privilege should apply because the article was on a matter of public interest
and was a product of responsible journalism.

The Jameel ruling is an example of an anonymous source being used to bring to light
a story of enormous public interest. The Wall Street Journal is a reputable newspaper,
known for unsensational journalism. Due to the nature of the story, it is contended
that without confidential informants, the information could not be published as very
few political officials are willing to speak on record about sensitive matters, such as
those relating to national security. The court took the reputation of the newspaper and
the attempts made by the WSJ to verify the information into account when
overturning the libel award.

McCann

In citing McCann v Express Newspapers 103 , this chapter examines the other end of the
spectrum with regard to the use of anonymous sources. The case centres on Kate and
Gerry McCann, the parents of three young children, the eldest of whom, Madeleine,
was abducted from the family’s holiday apartment in Portugul in May 2007. The
toddler’s abduction gave rise to unprecedented media coverage worldwide, with many
of the British tabloid media publishing sensational stories speculating on the child’s
fate. The case serves as a vivid illustration of the dangers of using unnamed sources,
both for individuals and for the press, in terms of libel awards and damage to
reputation. From the late summer of 2007 until February 2008, Express Newspaper,
which is the publisher of the Daily Express, the Sunday Express, the Daily Star and
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the Daily Star Sunday, published over 100 articles which were seriously defamatory
of the McCanns. The general theme of the articles was to suggest that Mr and Mrs
McCann were responsible for the death of their daughter and/or that there were strong
and reasonable grounds for such suspicions, There were also allegations that the
McCann’s had disposed of Madeleine’s body and that they had then conspired to
cover up their actions, including by creating ‘diversions’ to divert police attention
away from evidence which would expose their guilt. Many of these articles were
published on the front pages and almost all the allegations were attributed to
anonymous sources. In addition, the Daily Star published further articles which
alleged that Mr and Mrs McCann had sold their daughter to alleviate their financial
burdens. Another article claimed the McCann’s were involved in wife-swapping
orgies. A sample of such headlines and stories are included in the appendix.

In court, the defendant acknowledged that all the allegations were entirely false and
that there was no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Mr and Mrs McCann were
responsible for the death of their daughter or involved in a cover-up. The Daily
Express editor, Peter Hill, admitted that claims the McCann’s sold Madeleine and that
they were involved in ‘swinging’ were entirely baseless. Indeed, in court, counsel for
the defendant said: Express Newspapers regrets publishing these extremely serious,
yet baseless, allegations against the McCanns. 104 In recognition of the falsity of the
allegations, Express Newspapers agreed to publish full apologies on the front pages
and web sites of all its titles. In addition, Mr and Mrs McCann were awarded more
than £550,000 in damages.
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The issue in the McCann case, it is contended, is that the newspaper published false
stories over a sustained period of time, completely unchecked until the matter was
brought before the courts in a libel claim. It is asserted that if restrictions on the use of
anonymous sources were in place, such stories would not be published – or at least
less of such stories would go to print - because journalists would have to prove in
court that they took steps to substantiate the information before publishing claims
made by a confidential informant. Such steps would have to be proven regardless of
whether the article in question was the subject of a libel action. Under the proposed
restrictions, as laid out below, the mere publishing of material based on nameless
sources would be an offence unless the journalist had taken steps to prove the veracity
of the claims and could prove that there was no way of publishing the story without
the anonymous source, as was the case in Jameel. It is contended that such restrictions
would not stifle responsible investigatory journalism, as seen in Reynolds and Jameel
but would protect against the further erosion of the reputation of the press by curbing
the amount of baseless, sensationalised stories in the media. Using the McCann case
as an example, it is clear that in the pursuit of newspaper sales, editors are willing to
use anonymous sources to publish false information. It is contended that such actions
damage the free press by fostering a culture of media mistrust through the rise n the
number of libel actions. In addition, large payouts in damages in defamation cases
hurt the press financially with less funds available for investigatory journalism on
matters in the public interest, as was seem in the O’Brien case. It is contended, that if
the media is not capable of self-regulation, the legislature must step in to protect
reputation.

PCC argument
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The argument on the failings of media self-regulation warrants further discussion.
Remaining with the British example – simply because the problem is more acute
across the Channel- this chapter seeks to examine the role of the Press Complaints
Commission in regulating media output. The PCC was established as an alternative
to statutory interference after a committee was set up to: ‘…consider what measures
(whether legislative or otherwise) are needed to give further protection to individual
privacy from activities of the press and improve recourse for the individual
citizen.’ 105

The Calcutt Recommendations recommended that the former Press Council should be
disbanded and the Press Complaints Committee be set up to provide effective means
of redress for complaints against the press; adopt specific duties to consider unjust
and unfair treatment by the press, most notably on privacy issues and publish; and
monitor a comprehensive Code of Conduct for both the press and the public. It must
be noted that

the committee was set up against a background of increasing

parliamentary and public concern about unwarranted intrusion by the press into the
private lives of individuals 106 Perhaps it is for this reason that the PCC has proven
more effective in dealing with privacy issues, as will be highlighted below.
It was finally recommended that: ‘If the industry wishes to maintain a system of nonstatutory self-regulation, it must demonstrate its commitment, in particular by
providing the necessary money for setting up and maintaining the Press Complaints
Commission.’
105
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In order to examine the PCC’s effectiveness it is necessary to reproduce much of the
PCC’s mission statement here:

The Press Complaints Commission is an independent body which deals with
complaints from members of the public about the editorial content of
newspapers and magazines. Our service to the public is free, quick and easy.
We aim to deal with most complaints in just 35 working days - and there is
absolutely no cost to the people complaining.

The PCC received 4,698 complaints in 2008. Of the complaints that were
specified under the terms of the Code of Practice approximately two in three
were about accuracy in reporting and approximately one in five related to
intrusion into privacy of some sort. All complaints are investigated under the
editors' Code of Practice, which binds all national and regional newspapers
and magazines. The Code - drawn up by editors themselves - covers the way
in which news is gathered and reported. It also provides special protection to
particularly vulnerable groups of people such as children, hospital patients and
those at risk of discrimination.
Our main aim with any complaint which raises a possible breach of the Code
of Practice is always to resolve it as quickly as possible. Because of our
success in this, the Commission had to adjudicate on only 45 complaints in
2008. That is a sign not of the weakness of self regulation - but its strength.
All those which were critical of a newspaper were published in full and with
due prominence by the publication concerned.

Each paragraph will dealt with in turn, beginning with the first which states that the
PCC is an independent body. This claim is refuted by Max Mosely 107 who was, along
with Gerry McCann, asked to give evidence to a Commons select committee on press
self-regulation. The PCC may be independent from the government but it is not
impartial when it comes to regulating the press, according to Mr Mosely, who likened
the PCC to ‘putting the mafia in charge of the local police station.’ 108 He felt the
commission gave ‘preferential treatment to its own industry and lacked sufficient
107
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powers to deal appropriately with many complaints’. 109 In fact, Mr Mosley told MPs
that he had wanted to take the breach of his privacy up with the PCC but it had rules
banning complaints while legal proceedings were in action. 110 His assertions are back
up by Barendt and Hitchens, 111 who contend that the most frequent criticism of
voluntary regulation is that the PCC lacks effective sanction.

Moving to the second and third paragraphs, which explains the volume of complaints
and the code of practice, it is interesting to note the evidence Gerry McCann gave to
the Commons committee on his dealings with the PCC. Asked by MPs if he and his
wife, Kate, considered a complaint to the PCC, McCann said the outgoing Press
Complaints Commission chairman, Sir Christopher Meyer, advised him that his best
course of action was a legal claim.

This advice, it is contended, is startling, because it suggests that Sir Meyer did not
think that the PCC had a role to play in curbing the excesses of papers engaged in the
Madeleine McCann feeding frenzy, even though the PCC code clearly states:
‘[n]ewspapers should take care not to publish inaccurate, misleading or distorted
material.’ In passing the buck to the courts, he is essentially highlighting the
weakness of the PCC in press-regulation – stark contrast to the commission’s boasts
of the strength in paragraph four - and, it is asserted, the need to legislate this area.
The PCC does not have the power to intervene in defamation cases but it can, and
indeed should, contact a news medium against which a complaint has been lodged.
Had its code been heeded by Express Newspapers or had the PCC had the power to
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dole out punishment, it is likely the McCann case would never have gone to court,
nor, indeed, such defamatory, baseless stories have been run.

Interestingly, Mr Mcann, did say that the PCC had been helpful in protecting the
privacy of his other children. However, he went on to say that more stringent
regulation and a greater level of redress against press stories was required. There were
gaps in regulation, he said.

"There has to be some degree of control, I believe, or deterrent to publishing untrue
and particularly damaging stories where they have the potential to ruin people's
lives." 112

It is contended that the gaps Mr McCann spoke of could be filled by placing
restrictions on the use of anonymous sources to curb sensationalist, unsubstantiated
journalism.

To return to the Irish experience, it was highlighted in chapter one that journalists
tend to cling tightly to the tenets of the NUJ code of conduct, particularly its
prohibition on revealing sources. The code in the UK is a mirror image of that in
Ireland. It is interesting to note that when compelled by the courts to reveal their
informants, most journalists will refuse to do so, pointing to the NUJ code as binding
them more that the law of contempt. However, when it comes to the code of the PCC
and indeed the Press Council of Ireland - which demands ‘in reporting news and
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information, newspapers and periodicals shall strive at all times for truth and accuracy
– the media , particularly the tabloid press, have few qualms about ignoring it.

Both organisations are silent on the use of confidential sources, aside for calling for
protection of such informants, It is contended that this fact highlights the need to
introduced regulation in this area to prevent situations like that in McCann v Express
Newspapers where false information was churned out with check.

The Legislation

Drafting the proposed legislation is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, a
suggested format will be outlined. Regarding contempt of court and confidential
sources, the legislation would mirror that presently in the UK, with the ‘in the
interests of justice exception removed:

No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of
court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for
which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that
disclosure is necessary in the interests of national security or for the prevention of
disorder or crime.

The legislation would then include a caveat restricting the circumstances in which
such sources could be used:
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The protection of reputation being of such grave import to the common good,
news agencies may only publish unattributed information after reasonable
steps have been taken to ensure the veracity of the material obtained.
Reasonable steps, shall include, but are not limited to:

•

Verification from at least one other source, documentary or human,
that the information in question is correct.

•

The inclusion of a response from the subject against whom any
allegations may be made.

•

An attempt to locate a source willing to be named.

•

The inclusion of research and evidence of the practice of due care in
establishing the credibility of the claims made by the source.

It is contended that by introducing such a statutory measure, the law un this
jurisdiction would be brought closer in line to that in Sweden where absolute
protection for journalists’ sources is balanced by strict adherence to the code of ethics
and the office of the Press Ombudsman.
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Conclusion

It is widely accepted that a free press is fundamental to any democratic society, so too
is the effective administration of justice. In an ideal world journalists could be given a
carte blanche to disseminate news, entirely unchecked by the judiciary. However, as
this thesis has found, the world is not ideal and commercial pressure have the
potential to corrupt the most ethical of journalists. This thesis has discovered that
neither self-regulation nor absolute government control are palatable remedies to the
increasing trend toward sensational news stories.

It is contended that in order to strike the right balance better press freedom, the
administration of justice and the right to one’s good name, a happy-medium must be
found. Present law does not go far enough to protect journalists and their confidential
sources of information. In the absence of clear legislation, the courts tend to attach
greater weight to safe-guarding the administration of justice, thus, leaving journalists
vulnerable to contempt of court charges for refusing to reveal their sources. The
reticence of the courts to rule in favour of the press is rooted, it is contended, in the
increasing attacks on reputation by the press who mask baseless claims with
anonymous sources. Such reckless reporting has fostered a culture of media distrust
amongst the public and judiciary alike.

This thesis concludes that it is time for the legislature to step in and fill the lacuna in
the current law that leaves journalists in legal limbo when guaranteeing anonymity to
their sources and fails to protect individual from unjust attacks on their reputation
until after the offending material has been published.
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Statutory intervention offering absolute protection from disclosure to journalists who
use unattributed information within set parameters, it is contended, is the most
effective way of safeguarding the freedom of the press, while simultaneously curbing
the amount of libel actions that arise from the publication of material that have neither
credibility nor foundation.

The current trend toward sensationalism in the press cannot be permitted to continue
unchecked, it is contended. So too must the threat of contempt charges that hangs
over journalists, who have used anonymous sources to publish responsible journalism
in the public interest, be removed.
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